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Single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most commercially diffused solution for single-
photon counting in quantum key distribution (QKD) applications. However, the secondary photon
emission, arising from the avalanche of charge carriers during a photon detection, may be exploited
by an eavesdropper to gain information without forcing errors in the transmission key. In this paper,
we characterise such backflash light in gated InGaAs/InP SPADs, and its spectral and temporal
characterization for different detector models and different operating parameters. We qualitatively
bound the maximum information leakage due to backflash light, and propose a solution.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a
method for sharing of secret cryptographic keys between
two parties (Alice and Bob) with unprecedented level of
security [1–3]. This level of security is assured by the
laws of quantum mechanics and does not depend on tech-
nological resources available to an eavesdropper (Eve),
provided that the QKD implementation does not devi-
ate from its theoretical model. However, the security of
practical systems (as any other cryptographic system)
strongly depends on their device implementations. De-
viation of QKD devices from their theoretical model can
be exploited as side-channels or a back-doors [4, 5].
In 2010, two zero-error attacks on commercial QKD
systems were reported exploiting defects in quantum
signal encoding [4] and detection [5]. Shortly after, a
plethora of quantum hacking attacks have been imple-
mented with existing technologies to exploit devices im-
perfections in a number of QKD designs (different proto-
cols, modules and systems) [6–13]. To guarantee security,
each practical implementation must be carefully analyzed
and tested against zero-error attacks.
Single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) are the most
commercially-diffused solution for single photon detec-
tion in practical QKD implementation [14–21]. They can
also be the most vulnerable components because they
are optically exposed to Eve through the open quantum
channel. Eavesdropper can either inject strong light to
take control of these detectors to compromise the secu-
rity of an entire QKD system. Alternatively, Eve could
also measure passively any backflash light arising from
avalanching carriers [22] to learn the detected bit value
(Fig. 1). Backflashes have been shown to exist in both
InGaAs/InP and Si SPADs [23, 24]. However, these
demonstrations are limited to free-space detectors and
no experiments have been performed on fiber-pigtailed
SPADs, which are the detectors of choice for all existing
commercial QKD systems because of their practicality.
Here, we present the first characterization of back-
flash light in fiber-pigtailed InGaAs SPADs from differ-
ent manufacturers. We construct a reconfigurable optical
time domain reflectometer (OTDR) operating in the sin-
gle photon level [25–27] with exceptional sensitivity. This
OTDR allows an unambiguous identification of detector
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FIG. 1. Representation of an eavesdropper attack exploiting
backflash light. Alice sends the photons of the key to Bob;
when photons are revealed by Bob with a SPAD, a flash of
light, the backflash, is emitted back to the channel. Eve can
use a circulator to intercept this spot of light for acquiring
information about the detector that has clicked.
back-flashes from the conventional light back reflections,
and provides a practical way to bound the information
leakage, i.e., a fundamental step towards the QKD secu-
rity. Furthermore, we showed that information can be
leaked through back-flashes when two detector produce
temporally distinguishable secondary emissions.
The experimental setup. The experimental setup used
to analyze backflash light is depicted in Fig. 2. A
strongly attenuated pulsed laser sends photons at 1550
nm to the InGaAs/InP SPAD under test (DUT). The
back-reflected light is analysed with our photon-counting
OTDR [28, 29] in order to quantify the amount of sec-
ondary emission photons which could serve as an infor-
mation side-channel to Eve.
The source is a commercial 1550 nm pulsed diode laser
with pulse width of 300 ps and energy per pulse lower
than 1 fJ. The laser output is sent to a single-mode op-
tical fiber and attenuated to the single-photon level ex-
ploiting a fiber-coupled variable optical attenuator (max.
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FIG. 2. A schematic representation of our experimental
setup. A photon counting OTDR observes backflash light
from SPADs under test. The source is an attenuated pulsed
laser emitting at 1550 nm. Backflash light is detected by
a free running InGaAs/InP detector. Time stamping of de-
tected light is obtained by means of a correlator.
attenuation 60 dB) combined with an additional 20 dB
attenuation from a 99:1 fiber coupler.
We analyzed back-reflected and backflash light of two
different InGaAs/InP detectors. The first one, DUT1, is
a prototype single photon detection module [30]; the sec-
ond one, DUT2, is the commercial IdQuantique ID201,
widely used in research laboratories. Both detectors
are pigtailed and operate in gated mode.These devices
are highly configurable in terms of detection efficiency,
gate duration, and dead-time. They also exploit active
quenching and allow long avalanche durations (approxi-
mately 10 ns). Their configurability and long avalanche
duration make them ideal to study backflashes. The rep-
etition rate of the laser pulses and of the DUTs was
set with an external pulse generator to fpg = 50 kHz.
Both back-reflections and the DUTs’ backflashes were di-
rected by the circulator to the measuring detector, a free
running single-photon InGaAs/InP SPAD (IdQuantique
ID220). The detector was operated in order to have low
dark count rate (5 kHz), a nominal quantum efficiency of
10% and 130 ps timing resolution. The output electrical
signals from the OTDR detector as well as the one from
the DUTs are sent to time-correlation-photon-counting
(TCPC) electronics. Fig. 3 shows traces correspond-
ing to the OTDR signals triggered by the laser pulses
with an acquisition time of 60 minutes for DUT1 and
DUT2 (a) and (b), respectively. The histogram repre-
sents the returned photons (due either to backflashes or
back-reflections) as a function of time delay between the
laser pulse emission and the detection by the OTDR de-
tector. The horizontal axis depicts the time over which
a detected photon has traveled.
In Fig. 3 the sharp peaks arise from back-reflection at
the connections between different different slices of fiber
FIG. 3. Part a) and b) of the figure report the traces of the
optical correlator after 60 minutes of acquisition for DUT1
and DUT2, respectively. It is visible the backflash peak, pe-
culiar for each DUT, when an avalanche is triggered. We
set, for DUT1, an excess bias voltage of 7 V, corresponding
to a detection efficiency higher than 35 % and a gate width
of 20 ns, while, for DUT2 the efficiency is 10% and the gate
width is 100 ns. Observing the zoom of the backflash peak for
DUT1 and for DUT2, different shapes of the backflash peaks
are evident.
or between the fiber and other optical elements in the
path (e.g. the circulator). There is also a rectangular
and trapezoidal shaped feature that appears only when
DUTs are switched on. We attribute this feature to back-
flash light emitted by the DUTs during avalanches. Each
type of DUTs has a unique, identifiable temporal profile,
which gives away the information of the detector type
and its manufacturer. We confirmed this finding by test-
ing additional 4 devices of DUT1 type and 2 of DUT2
type. Identifiable backflash profiles can be exploited by
Eve to launch attacks tailored according to the detector
type.
Photoemission characterization. We evaluate the max-
imum possible information leakage PL due to backflash
light for QKD systems implemented with detectors of
type either DUT1 or DUT2. We consider a poorly de-
3FIG. 4. Information leakage PL as a function of different
excess bias voltages for the prototype detector DUT1. The
peak of backreflected light is also reported: the smaller peak
due to reflection of laser light on the diode surface is relatively
more evident for low excess bias voltages.
signed QKD system which allows complete temporal dis-
crimination of backflashes between different detectors.
PL was estimated starting from the ratio between the
number of detected backflashes, NB and the correspond-
ing total number of valid counts NP of the DUT. NB
refers to only backflash events, i.e. after background sub-
traction. We considered the worst case scenario of the
eavesdropper having an ideal equipment, i.e. lossless and
with an ideal (unit) photon detection efficiency. Thus PL
was evaluated as
PL =
NB
NP · ηdet · ηch
(1)
where corrections for losses and inefficiencies of the
OTDR system are applied, i.e. for the detection effi-
ciency of the OTDR detector ηdet, and for the losses in
the optical channel connecting the DUT and the OTDR
detector due to the circulator and the fiber connections,
ηch. To be conservative, we slightly overestimated losses
and inefficiencies assuming ηchηdet=0.05 on the basis of
their approximate evaluations. We obtain an informa-
tion leakage PL of 9.8 % for DUT1 and of 6.0 % for
DUT2. These results suggest that the information that
Eve can get by observing backflash light is not negligible
and countermeasures have to be in place.
The backflash light is a consequence of carrier
avalanches, which can be triggered by an absorbed pho-
ton when the device is biased beyond its breakdown
voltage. It is quenched, together with the avalanche it-
self when the detector bias is lowered below breakdown.
Thus, the intensity of the backflashes strongly depends on
the parameter setting of the quenching electronics. We
investigated the information leakage percentage in DUT1
for different detector operating condition, i.e. varying
detection efficiency, gate width etc. . The results are
È È
È
Â Â
Â
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
8
10
PL(%) 
Vbias = 7 V 
Vbias = 3 V 
0 5 10 15 20 25
100
10
4
10
6
2 ns 
ns 
C
o
u
n
ts
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
100
10
4
10
6
10 ns 
ns 
C
o
u
n
ts
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
100
10
4
10
6
18 ns 
ns 
C
o
u
n
ts
 
ns 
FIG. 5. Information leakage as a function of different arrival
time of laser photons respect to the gate window that triggers
the DUT. The data refer to different bias voltage of DUT1, 7
V and 3V.
summarized in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. In Fig. 4, information
leakage as a function of different excess bias voltages for
DUT1 is reported. We used three different settings of
excess bias voltages, 3 V, 4.5 V and 7 V, corresponding
to a nominal detection efficiency of 15%, 22% and 35%,
respectively. As shown, the backflash intensity increases
with the excess bias of the detector, since the number of
carriers also increases.
Fig. 5 shows the information leakage as a function of
the DUT gate delay relative to the incident laser pulses
(2 ns, 10 ns and 18 ns after the beginning of the gat-
ing window). The two set of data refer to different bias
voltage of DUT1: 7 V and 3V. A decrease of the infor-
mation leakage is observed when the laser photons ar-
rive at the end of the gating window. This is because
late avalanches are quenched by the following edge of the
gate window, rather than by the active quenching circuit.
The same effect explains the behavior observed when the
laser peak is centered respect to the gating window but
the latter presents different gating window width. Infor-
mation leakage is reduced when a gating window compa-
rable with the width of the temporal profile of backflash
emission in DUT1 is used (e.g. 5 ns or less).
To study the spectral distribution of the backflash
emission, we integrated in our OTDR system a fiber optic
tunable optical filter (Santec OTF-970) before the OTDR
measuring detector. The filter spectral range is from 1530
nm to 1600 nm and we set 10 nm of pass bandwidth. Re-
sults are reported in Fig. 6a: the four reported profiles
are the temporal distribution of the backflash counts, re-
spectively centered at 1530 nm, 1550 nm, 1570 nm and
1600 nm. The temporal emission profile is similar to the
one obtained without spectral filtering (Fig. 3a) for all
the wavelengths. When the filter is centered on 1550 nm,
the reflection peak dominates.
Fig. 6 (b) reports the total backflash counts as a func-
4tion of the filter center wavelength. The subtraction of
backreflected light is performed measuring the laser light
backreflected by DUT1 with bias voltage applied but in
absence of gate signal. Backflash emission is broadband,
at least beyond the spectral range of our tunable filter,
because it is due to the relaxation of hot carriers gener-
ated in the multiplication region [31, 32]. In the spectral
region of our tunable filter it is reasonably uniform, ex-
cept for the region around the 1550 nm (1545 - 1555 nm)
where a peak is observed even after the subtraction of the
laser light backreflected by the DUT (see the sharp peak
in Fig. 6a). It is reasonably expected that the sharp peak
present even after the background subtraction is due to
backreflected laser light, since we observed that the re-
flectivity of the diode varies with the applied bias [33]
and we attribute this to the refractive index change in
the semiconductor material [34].
This is confirmed by the measurement of backflashes
spectrum performed with a pulsed laser at 1570 nm as
source of our spectrally filtered OTDR. In this configura-
tion we expected to observe the sharp peak disappearing
at 1550 nm, and appearing at 1570 nm, and, indeed this
was exactly what happened, confirming that the sharp
peak was just due to the change of reflectivity of the
SPAD surface due to its bias voltage change.
Conclusion. We proved that backflashes are significant
in commercial InGaAs/InP single photon detector oper-
ating at telecom wavelength. These backflashes could
potentially allow a serious security breach in a poorly de-
signed QKD system. Proper design and testing of QKD
systems should be implemented in order to avoid attacks
based on backflashes. Possible solutions can be based on
passive optical devices [35] such as isolators, circulators
or spectral filters to prevent backflashes leaking out of the
QKD system. We underline that these countermeasures
should consider the wide bandwidth of the backflash light
emission. Careful characterisation of the spectral behav-
ior of this optical components are necessary to ensure
their operation as countermeasures.
Following this line of thought, a combination of circu-
lators or isolators with interference optical filters at the
input of the QKD system should essentially nullify the
information leakage due to backflash light at the cost of
some additional optical loss (the insertion losses of the
optical filter and of the circulator) on the QKD signal.
Furthermore, as discussed in connection with Fig. 5, the
use of as short as possible gates and small avalanche will
reduce the emitted backflash light. In this sense, fast-
gated detectors [36–41] represent an interesting solution
for QKD systems not only in terms of speed but also
for their much lower avalanche charges (even 100 times
lower!). In fact, it is expected that they produce a sig-
nificant low backflash light emission. In addition, use
of short gates make it harder for Eve for temporal dis-
crimination of backflash light. Testing backflashes of fast
gated detectors is an interesting research direction.
For QKD application, superconducting nanowire
single-photon detector are an excellent option. Indeed,
FIG. 6. Temporal distribution of the backflash counts after
spectral filtering, respectively centered at 1530 nm (a)), 1550
nm (b)) and 1600 nm (c)). Part d) refers to the total counts
of backflash light in the observed spectral range (from 1530
nm to 1600 nm). All measurements are performed with 10
nm bandwidth filters.
in addition to their high detection efficiency, their low
dark-count rate, and their short recovery time [42], is is
expected that they do not present any backflash light (i.e.
any related information leakage). Unfortunately, they
need cryogenic temperature of operation and because of
the high cost of cryogenic equipment they appear at the
moment not suitable for practical deployment of QKD
systems in the real world.
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